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Abstract Individual differences in working memory capac-
ity (WMC) predict individual differences in basically all
tasks that demand some form of cognitive labor, especially
if the persons conducting the task are exposed to distraction.
As such, tasks that measure WMC are very useful tools in
individual-differences research. However, the predictive
power of those tasks, combined with conventional statistical
tools that cannot support the null hypothesis, also makes it
difficult to study the limits of that power. In this article, we
review studies that have failed to find a relationship between
WMC and effects of auditory distraction on visual–verbal
cognitive performance, and use meta-analytic Bayesian sta-
tistics to test the null hypothesis. The results favor the
assumption that individual differences in WMC are, in fact,
not (always) related to the magnitude of distraction.
Implications for the nature of WMC are discussed.
Keywords Working memory capacity . Null hypothesis .
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Individual differences in working memory capacity—typi-
cally assessed with so-called complex-span tasks that com-
bine short-term memory processes with concurrent
distractor activities—predict performance on most (if not
all) cognitively challenging tasks, including reading com-
prehension (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), reasoning
(Copeland & Radvansky, 2004), intelligence tests (Süß,
Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002), and even
moral judgments (Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). On the
unusual occasion that a relation between working memory
capacity (WMC) and task performance is not found, even
when the task involves top-down cognitive control (Kane,
Poole, Tuholski, & Engle, 2006), a relation is typically
found when distraction is added (Poole & Kane, 2009).
These observations have led to the broadly accepted view
that WMC is a very general executive attention mechanism
(Kane et al., 2004) that is used to resolve interference across
a wide range of domains and to overcome distraction. As
was stated by Randall W. Engle (2002, p. 20): “WM capac-
ity is not directly about memory—it is about using attention
to maintain or suppress information. . . . Thus, greater WM
capacity also means greater ability to use attention to avoid
distraction.”
The nature of the “general mechanism” that appears to be
tapped by WMC tasks is still a subject of debate: For
instance, according to the focus-of-attention view, high-
WMC individuals are less susceptible to distraction because
they can focus (or constrain) attention to to-be-attended
targets (Heitz & Engle, 2007); according to the inhibition
view, they are less susceptible to distraction because they
have a superior inhibition capacity (Lustig, Hasher, &
Zacks, 2008); and according to the primary-and-second-
ary-memory view, they are less susceptible to distraction
because they manage to maintain the goal-directed task set
(or task instruction) in working memory, even when chal-
lenged by stimuli that capture attention (Unsworth & Engle,
2007a). Notably, all of these views agree that high WMC
should attenuate distraction. If individual differences in
WMC really reflect the ability to combat distraction, then
they should predict individual variation in susceptibility to
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the effects of task-irrelevant sound on visual–verbal tasks
(such as recall of written prose). However, in one particular
experimental setting called the irrelevant-sound paradigm, a
relationship between WMC and the disruptive effects of
sound on task performance has been elusive. In the
irrelevant-sound paradigm, participants are visually
presented with sequences of items, and they are requested
to recall those items in the order of presentation (i.e., a serial
recall task). Some sequences are presented against a back-
ground of sound (e.g., speech tokens or tones), and others
are presented in silence. When sound is present, serial recall
is typically impaired. This is called the irrelevant-sound
effect (Beaman & Jones, 1997; Jones & Macken, 1993).
According to the general notion that high WMC should
attenuate distraction, one would expect high-WMC individ-
uals to be less susceptible to the irrelevant-sound effect. In
this article, we review studies of the role for WMC in the
irrelevant-sound paradigm and provide meta-analytic
Bayesian evidence to show that high WMC, in fact, does
not always attenuate distraction. Understanding the mecha-
nisms of auditory distraction can, therefore, reveal just how
general the “general mechanism” is that is tapped by WMC
tasks. In particular, it can specify the conditions wherein
high WMC attenuates distraction, and those conditions in
which it does not.
Mechanisms of auditory distraction
We begin this discussion by characterizing two different
types of effects of sound on serial recall. A continuously
changing sound stream (e.g., “k l m v r q c”) impairs serial
short-term memory more than a less variable sound stream
(e.g., “c c c c c c c”; Jones & Macken, 1993). This is called
the changing-state effect, which has become the key empir-
ical referent of the irrelevant-sound effect. The sound stream
does not have to be continuously changing, however, to
disrupt serial recall. A sound sequence within which a single
sound element abruptly deviates from the rest (such as “m”
in the sequence “p p p p p p m p p”) is also more disruptive
than a nonchanging sequence. This is called the deviation
effect (Hughes, Vachon, & Jones, 2005, 2007). The
changing-state and deviation effects are the most studied
forms of auditory distraction in the context of serial recall;
they both reflect change-detection mechanisms associated
with auditory analysis. However, there is some tension
within the literature as to whether or not the two effects
share a similar mechanism of disruption.
According to a unitary account, both the changing-state
effect and the deviation effect are explained by the same
(attention capture) mechanism. According to this view, each
item in a changing-state irrelevant sequence (e.g., “k l m v r
q c”) acts as a deviant, thereby repeatedly capturing
attention from the focal serial-recall task (Bell, Dentale,
Buchner, & Mayr, 2010; Bell, Röer, Dentale, & Buchner,
2012; Chein & Fiez, 2010; Cowan, 1995; Elliott, 2002;
Weisz & Schlittmeier, 2006). Alternatively, according to
the duplex account (Hughes et al., 2005, 2007; Sörqvist,
2010), the deviation effect and the changing-state effect are
produced by functionally different mechanisms. The duplex
account and the unitary account agree on the mechanism
underpinning the deviation effect (i.e., attention capture),
but the duplex account holds—in contrast to the unitary
account—that the changing-state effect is caused by the
involuntary processing of the order information within a
changing auditory sequence that conflicts with the similar
process of deliberately ordering the to-be-remembered stim-
uli: the process of serial rehearsal (Beaman & Jones, 1997;
Hughes & Jones, 2005; Hughes et al., 2007; Jones &
Macken, 1993). Therefore, the changing-state effect is pro-
duced as a consequence of the type of processing that the
focal task entails—serial rehearsal—and not because the
sound captures/diverts attention away from the focal task
(Hughes, Hurlstone, Marsh, Vachon, & Jones, in press;
Hughes et al., 2005, 2007; Sörqvist, 2010). A key finding
—of particular relevance to the present report—is that if it is
perceptually difficult to identify the to-be-recalled items,
due to a visual-masking manipulation, the deviation effect
diminishes, whereas the same manipulation does not reduce
the changing-state effect (Hughes et al., in press). It appears,
therefore, that greater task engagement (following percep-
tual masking of the to-be-recalled items) locks attention to
the target materials, and consequently, the auditory deviant
loses its power to divert attention away from the focal task.
The changing-state effect, in contrast, is not modulated by
task engagement.
The role of WMC in auditory distraction
The unitary account of auditory distraction predicts that indi-
vidual differences in strategic cognitive control—synony-
mous with WMC—should be associated with the magnitude
of both the changing-state effect and the deviation effect. That
is, attentional capture by a single deviant, and by changing-
state sound sequences, should be diminished for individuals
with highWMCwho can—through executive control—block
attentional switches to changing irrelevant events. To date, at
least nine experiments have been conducted that have tested
the correlation between individual differences in complex-
span task scores and individual differences in the magnitude
of the irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect. Most of them
have found no significant correlation (Beaman, 2004; Elliott
& Briganti, 2012; Hughes et al., in press; Sörqvist, 2010), and
a few of them have reported inconsistent results (Elliott &
Cowan, 2005; Elliott, Barrilleaux, &Cowan, 2006). Likewise,
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a handful of articles have reported correlations between “sim-
ple-span task scores” (i.e., performance on short-termmemory
tasks that only involve recall of a list of items, in contrast to
complex-span tasks that combine this short-term memory task
with a second, concurrent activity) and the magnitude of the
irrelevant-sound effect (Ellermeier & Zimmer, 1997; Elliott &
Cowan, 2005; Macken, Phelps, & Jones, 2009; Neath, Farley,
& Surprenant, 2003). None have found significant negative
correlations, most reporting correlation coefficients close to
zero. In marked contrast, several studies have revealed that
high-WMC individuals are less susceptible to the deviation
effect (Hughes et al., in press; Sörqvist, 2010) and less sus-
ceptible to auditory distraction when it is studied outside the
irrelevant-sound paradigm (e.g., Conway, Cowan, & Bunting,
2001; Marsh, Sörqvist, Hodgetts, Beaman, & Jones, 2013;
Sörqvist, Nöstl, & Halin, 2012).
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it seems that
high-WMC individuals, in fact, cannot withstand all types
of distraction. Specifically, WMC appears to be unrelated to
the irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect. This general
finding is important, inasmuch as it undermines the logical
assumption—in terms of the unitary account of auditory
distraction—that relationships exist between WMC and
both the changing-state effect and the deviation effect
(Bell et al., 2010, 2012; Chein & Fiez, 2010; Cowan,
1995; Elliott, 2002; Weisz & Schlittmeier, 2006).
However, the conclusion that WMC is not associated with
the irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect rests on the as-
sumption that the null hypothesis is true. This conclusion
cannot be supported using conventional statistical tech-
niques (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009).
Here, we report a Bayes factor meta-analysis (Rouder &
Morey, 2011) of studies on the relationship between WMC
and the irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect. Our assump-
tion is that individual differences in working memory task
scores are unrelated to the irrelevant-sound/changing-state
effect. For comparison purposes, we also analyzed the rela-
tion between WMC and the deviation effect using the same
Bayesian analysis technique. Support for the null hypothesis
(i.e., that WMC is indeed unrelated to the magnitude of the
irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect) would have implica-
tions for the nature of WMC: that is, for when high WMC
does and does not attenuate distraction.
Method
We begin by reviewing our selection criteria for the inclu-
sion of studies. We also describe how we categorized the
studies on the basis of type of effect (i.e., irrelevant-
sound/changing-state effect vs. deviation effect). The stud-
ies included in the meta-analysis and their characteristics
can be found in Table 1.
Selection criteria of studies
Only irrelevant-sound paradigm studies were included in the
meta-analysis. That is, the effect of sound was studied by
requesting participants to recall—in order of presentation—
visually presented items, either against a background of
sound or in silence. This type of analysis also constrained
selection. The relationship between WMC and the magni-
tude of auditory distraction had to be analyzed either by
calculating the difference scores between serial recall in
silence and serial recall in the sound condition, and then
reporting the correlation coefficients between those differ-
ence scores and individual differences in WMC, or by
conducting a corresponding regression analysis. Group
comparisons, wherein participants who vary in WMC are
divided into high-/low-WMC groups and the researchers
analyze the interaction between group (i.e., high vs. low
WMC) and sound condition (i.e., sound vs. silence), were
excluded from the meta-analysis. It should be noted, though,
that the extreme-group analyses have failed to find signifi-
cant interactions (Beaman, 2004, Exp. 3). Furthermore,
some studies have not reported the statistic of nonsignificant
relat ionships between WMC and the irrelevant-
sound/changing-state effect (e.g., Elliott & Cowan, 2005).
They are hence not included in the meta-analysis, but further
reinforce the null hypothesis.
The type of task used to assess WMC was also a selection
criterion. The task had to belong to the family of complex-
span tasks (such as operation span and reading span) or in
some other way combine mnemonic and elaboration pro-
cesses (such as the running memory span task, in which the
participant’s task is to view a sequence of items of an
unknown length and to recall a set of the most recent items
after list presentation, a task that requires continuous
updating of the memory set). Studies of the relationship
between performance on simple-span tasks and the magni-
tude of the irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect were not
included in the meta-analysis. Finally, the scoring method of
the task used to assess WMC was considered. When differ-
ent scoring methods were used and reported, only one of
them (the one with the single highest correlation coefficient
between WMC and auditory distraction magnitude) was
selected for the meta-analysis (this only concerns data from
Elliott & Cowan, 2005).
Categorization of correlation coefficients based on the type
of effect
In terms of the relationships between WMC and the various
measures of auditory distraction magnitude, the studies were
classified as studies of either the irrelevant-sound/changing-
state effect or the deviation effect. A study in which the
auditory distraction measure was obtained by comparing a
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changing-state sound sequence (e.g., continuous speech or a
sequence of changing tones) without oddball elements (i.e., a
sound element that abruptly deviated from an otherwise un-
changing sound sequence) with a nonchanging sound condi-
tion (e.g., silence, broadband noise, or a steady-state sound
sequence) was classified as an irrelevant-sound/changing-
state effect study. A study in which the auditory distraction
measure was obtained by comparing a sound condition with
an oddball sound element to a nonchanging sound condition
was classified as a deviation effect study.
Results
A total of 14 correlation coefficients for the relation between
WMC and auditory distraction were obtained from the litera-
ture review (Table 1). In order to do a Bayesian meta-analysis,
the correlation coefficients were converted to t values. This
was done by using the following formula:
t ¼ r p n2ð Þ½  p 1r2 
See Table 2 for the initial correlation coefficients and
their corresponding converted t values. When the direction
of the correlation coefficient was uncertain (as when the
reported statistic is an R2 value), the converted t values
assumed a negative relationship (i.e., that higher WMC
was associated with a smaller effect). The conclusions from
control analyses assuming positive values instead were en-
tirely consistent with those reported. A script in the R
program (e.g., Ihaka & Gentleman, 1996) was used to
calculate Bayes factors from the t values (Rouder &
Morey, 2011). It should be noted that this transformation,
from regression slopes to t values, is not unquestionable in
this context. The Bayes factor is calculated by dividing the
probability for the null hypothesis (H0) with the probability
for the alternative (i.e., H1). If the value is less than 1, the
evidence favors the alternative, and if the value is greater
than 1, the evidence instead favors H0. In the context of
regression slopes, H0 is, naturally, the absence of a
Table 1 Reports included in the meta-analysis and their characteristics
Report Number Predictor Name Test Statistic N Effect Sound
Beaman (2004) 1 OSPAN R2 = .002 38 ISE Speech
Elliott et al. (2006) 2 OSPAN r = –.26 101 ISE Tones
3 RunSPAN R2 = .02 101 ISE Tones
Elliott & Briganti (2012) 4 Mixed R2 = .002 78 ISE Speech
Elliott & Cowan (2005) 5 RSPAN r = –.03 64 ISE Speech
6 RSPAN r = –.15 64 ISE Tones
7 OSPAN r = +.57 64 ISE Speech
8 OSPAN r = +.30 64 ISE Tones
Hughes et al. (in press) 9 OSPAN r = +.046 31 ISE Speech
10 OSPAN r = –.38 24 D Speech
Sörqvist (2010) 11 OSPAN r = –.14 40 ISE Speech
12 OSPAN r = +.19 48 ISE Tones
13 OSPAN r = –.35 40 D Speech
14 OSPAN r = –.31 48 D Tones
OSPAN = operation span; RunSPAN = running memory span; RSPAN = reading span; Mixed = an average score for several complex-span tasks;
ISE = irrelevant-sound effect/changing-state effect; D = deviation effect
Table 2 Test statistics and their corresponding Bayes factors (BFs)
Number Test Statistic N Converted t Value BF
Irrelevant-Sound/Changing-State Effect
1 R2 = .002 38 −0.269 7.7
2 r = –.26 101 −2.679 0.4
3 R2 = .02 101 −1.421 4.7
4 R2 = .002 78 −0.390 10.4
5 r = –.03 64 −0.23633 9.9
6 r = –.15 64 −1.195 5.1
7 r = +.57 64 5.462 0.00006
8 r = +.30 64 2.476 0.6
9 r = +.046 31 0.248 7
11 r = –.14 40 −0.872 5.6
12 r = +.19 48 1.313 3.8
Deviation Effect
10 r = –.38 24 −1.9269 1.2
13 r = –.35 40 −2.303 0.7
14 r = –.31 48 −2.211 0.9
When the direction of the correlation coefficient was uncertain (as
when the reported statistic is an R2 value), the converted t values
assumed a negative relationship (i.e., that higher WMC would be
associated with a smaller effect)
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relationship (i.e., r=0). However, the alternative slope (i.e.,
H1) is not equally straightforward (Rouder & Morey, 2012).
As the r values were transformed to t values, we considered
the alternative slope (i.e., H1) to be corresponding to a
difference between two mean values (or the difference be-
tween a mean and 0). In other words, the alternative slope
could assume a range of values (e.g., from r=–.50 to r=–.70);
it was not a specific value.
The irrelevant-sound effect
Table 2 shows the individual Bayes factors for coeffi-
cient numbers 1–9, 11, and 12. A meta-analysis of
those coefficients revealed a Bayes factor of 32 in
favor of the null hypothesis. A Bayes factor of 32
indicates that the data are about 32 times as likely
to have occurred under H0, as compared to H1. This
is considered to be “substantial” evidence for H0
(Jeffreys, 1961). Given the contradicting evidence in
the included studies, a prior of 50% was chosen, which
resulted in a posterior probability of 97% for the null
hypothesis. It should be noted that the support for H0
would still hold with different priors (e.g., a prior of
25% would result in a posterior probability of 91%,
and a prior of 75% would result in a posterior proba-
bility of 99%). In short, there is most likely no rela-
tionship between WMC and the magnitude of the
irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect.
The deviation effect
The meta-analytic Bayes factor for coefficient numbers 10,
13, and 14 (Table 2) was calculated as 0.02, which corre-
sponds to “very strong” evidence against the null hypothesis
(Jeffreys, 1961). As the Bayes factor is below 1, the odds are
shifted in favor of H1. In this case, the odds for H1 should
be shifted by a factor of 50 (i.e., 1/0.02). Given the strong
evidence from a plethora of studies showing that WMC is
linked to resilience against different forms of distraction, a
prior probability for H0 of 25% was chosen. Under this prior
assumption, the posterior probability of the null hypothesis
approaches 0.5%. Hence, the results favor the alternative
hypothesis: High-WMC individuals are less susceptible to
the deviation effect.
Discussion
The results of the Bayesian meta-analysis confirmed that
WMC is unrelated to the irrelevant-sound/changing-state
effect. This is rather troublesome for the general assumption
that high-WMC individuals are better able to use attention to
avoid distraction (e.g., Engle, 2002; Kane, Bleckley,
Conway, & Engle, 2001). At the very least, our findings
suggest that this is an oversimplification. To reconcile the
results, the concept of “attention”—in relation to WMC—
has to be clarified. The auditory distraction literature can be
used as a guide to this end.
The Bayesian analysis suggests that WMC is related to
distraction from auditory oddballs (i.e., the deviation effect),
but not to the irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect. The
unitary model—which supposes that the disruption pro-
duced by a continuously changing irrelevant sequence
should also be controllable—is undermined by this
Bayesian analysis, which in turn supports the duplex ac-
count of auditory distraction in the context of short-term
memory. There appears to be a functional difference be-
tween the two types of effects that specifies when WMC
modulates distraction and when it does not (although we
acknowledge that no direct statistical comparison was made
here between models for the relations between WMC and
the irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect and between
WMC and the deviation effect; but see Sörqvist, 2010).
The deviation effect is produced by an involuntary atten-
tional switch to the deviating sound (Hughes et al., in press;
Hughes et al., 2007), a reallocation of attention that presum-
ably occurs because the deviating event could represent a
potential threat. In other words, the deviating sound causes
shifts in the locus of attention. The changing-state effect, in
turn, is not a result of a switched locus of attention. Instead,
it reflects the manifestation of a conflict between the
involuntary/obligatory processing of order information
within the changing irrelevant sequence—as a byproduct
of the sequential streaming process (Bregman, 1990)—and
the deliberate process of serially rehearsing the to-be-
serially recalled material (Hughes et al., in press; Hughes
et al., 2005, 2007). The irrelevant-sound/changing-state ef-
fect is, in short, a disruption of the acts of attention. In fact,
serial rehearsal and attention might be considered synony-
mous: It is an act of attention to serially reproduce the
visual–verbal sequence of to-be-recalled items. This repro-
duction is accomplished through evoking speech-based
motor-skills, in an attempt to organize a sequential output
of the to-be-recalled items that, at presentation, have been
deliberately stripped of syntactic or semantic rules that can
be used as cues to serial order: The resultant motor plan is
one means by which the order of the items can be
maintained (Hughes, Marsh, & Jones, 2009; Jones,
Hughes, & Macken, 2006). As a deliberate attentional act,
individuals with high WMC may be better at the serial-
recall task, particularly for longer lists, without the
presence of distraction (Beaman, 2004; Unsworth &
Engle, 2007b), but they will be equally susceptible to
the irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect. This is be-
cause the irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect appears
to be an automatic, obligatory effect that cannot be
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attenuated by the availability of executive resources.
Rather, the magnitude of this effect is (positively) relat-
ed to individual differences in the perceptual ability to
extract order information from sound sequences (Macken
et al., 2009).
High-WMC individuals can overrule an undesired switch
of the locus of attention (i.e., the deviation effect), but they
cannot withstand disruption to the acts of attention when those
acts are incompatible with obligatory processing of task-
irrelevant stimuli (i.e., the changing-state effect). In what
way is WMC related to the ability to overrule attentional
capture? First, the deviation effect (and, hence, attentional
capture) is eliminated when the to-be-recalled stimuli are
embedded in visual noise (Hughes et al., in press). This
manipulation increases task difficulty (by increasing the diffi-
culty of identifying the to-be-remembered items), in terms of
sensory encoding load. Second, the deviation effect is reduced
by foreknowledge about the impending occurrence of a devi-
ant (Hughes et al., in press): The presentation of a 100%-valid
warning cue before each deviant trial eliminates the effect of
the deviant. Both of those findings suggest that greater task
engagement—the degree to which the locus of attention is
constrained to the focal task—whether it is induced by
masking the to-be-recalled items or by preparing the partici-
pant for upcoming distraction, reduces the deviant sound’s
capability to change the locus of attention. We believe that
WMC modulates the deviation effect in a similar way.
Modulation of distraction by WMC is a result of internally
generated task engagement, similar to externally generated
task-engagement manipulations such as masking and warn-
ings. Through the deployment of top-down cognitive control
—which can block orienting responses to the deviant—high
WMC is associated with a more steadfast locus of attention.
Individual differences in WMC are not associated with the
magnitude of the irrelevant-sound effect (or changing-state
effect) because the very (attentional) act of performing the
serial-recall task leaves performance vulnerable to disruption
from a sound stream that changes continuously. Therefore,
providing that serial rehearsal remains the dominant strategy,
distraction via the changing-state effect is inevitable and irre-
sistible (Jones, Hughes, & Macken, 2010).
The view that acts of attention compete with shifts of
attentional locus offers a far better explanation for how
WMC dichotomizes the changing-state and deviation effects
than does the idea thatWMC predicts distractibility per se due
to differences in the capacity to store to-be-recalled items
within a memory space (Beaman, 2004): People who already
have a high memory load (low WMC; note that here we use
WMC as a proxy for load) are as distracted by changing-state
sound as are those with low memory load. If anything, higher
WMC is sometimes associated with a greater magnitude of the
irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect (see Table 1), but the
reason for this appears to be a “floor effect,” wherein low-
WMC individuals score relatively low on the serial-recall task
in silence and with background sound, whereas high-WMC
individuals get higher recall scores in the silent control con-
dition (Elliott & Cowan, 2005). This results in a larger differ-
ence between the two conditions for high-WMC individuals.
The conclusion that WMC is unrelated to disruption that
emerges from the mechanism underpinning the irrelevant-
sound/changing-state effect receives further support from the
observations that only the changing-state effect, but not the
deviation effect, appears to be susceptible to actual memory
load. For example, the changing-state effect is more pro-
nounced as the burden on memory increases: Changing-state
sound coincident with the first four to-be-recalled items of an
eight-item sequence—when the memory load is low—pro-
duces little or no disruption, as compared to when the sound is
presented during the second part of the list or during a reten-
tion period—when the memory load is relatively high, due to
the burden on serial rehearsal (Macken, Mosdell, & Jones,
1999). That the irrelevant-sound/changing-state effect does
not differ in magnitude as a function of WMC when different
list lengths are presented (Beaman, 2004) further reinforces
the view that WMC—considered as being analogous to mem-
ory load, in this instance—does not modulate this effect.
The assumption that high-WMC individuals enjoy less
susceptibility to distraction from having higher task engage-
ment, and thereby overruling changes to the locus of atten-
tion, fits well with findings outside of the irrelevant-sound
paradigm. For instance, task-irrelevant visual stimuli
presented on a visual display capture attention to a greater
degree in low-WMC individuals (Kane et al., 2001).
Likewise, if the participant’s own name is spoken in a to-
be-ignored channel while the participant is deliberately fo-
cusing attention to another channel, the name tends to cap-
ture attention, but more so for low-WMC individuals
(Conway et al., 2001). And high-WMC individuals can
more effectively constrain/focus attention to specific target
items, so as not to be distracted by irrelevant stimuli adja-
cent to the target items (Heitz & Engle, 2007). In each case,
high-WMC individuals appear to be less susceptible to
distraction than are their low-WMC counterparts, because
of their higher task engagement (i.e., a more steadfast locus
of attention).
In summary, this article has aimed to characterize the
“general mechanism” that is tapped by WMC tasks and,
in particular, to specify the limits of the assumption that
high WMC attenuates distraction. Not all instances of
change detection are controllable, and WMC—through
top-down strategic cognitive/executive control—only
modulates change-detection mechanisms that (typically)
lead to a change of the locus of attention (Conway et
al., 2001; Hughes et al., in press; Kane et al., 2001;
Sörqvist, 2010). The Bayesian analysis presented here
clearly shows that WMC does not modulate distraction
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that emerges from the mechanism underpinning the
irrelevant-sound effect.
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